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The agenda of post-communisttransformation seemed to havefaded away in Central Asiancountries until the tragic terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. In the
aftermath of the Iraq War, democratization
in “failed” and authoritarian states has
rapidly become the focus of U.S. foreign
policy. Since the events in Kyrgyzstan,
Central Asia has been added to the debate
on third-wave democratization that has
been witnessed in Georgia and Ukraine. In
light of the increasing turbulence in Iraq
and the unexpected death of
Turkmenistan’s President Niyazov, the
challenges for democratization in Central
Asia should be reevaluated. This article
argues that the prospects for democracy in
that region are vulnerable to internal and
external actors as well as structural
problems in the individual states, which
possess vast energy resources and crucial
routes for exporting them.  Thus, to avoid
the error of coddling dictators to serve its
agenda, the United States should consider
developing a longer-term policy that takes
into consideration not only the strategic
importance of Central Asia, but also the
development of its civil society.
STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS
For much of the 1990s, U.S. economic
assistance to the region was delivered
under the auspices of the Freedom Support
Act, but levels of funding fluctuated.1
Assistance has increased with the imple-
mentation of Operation Enduring Free-
dom.2  Transferring nuclear weapons out
of Kazakhstan and preventing Iran’s
involvement in oil and gas projects in the
region were the priorities of U.S. foreign
policy in the 1990s.3  The post-September
11 rhetoric of U.S. foreign policy insists
that democracy is essential to the under-
mining of conditions that engender terror-
ism. However, the strategy of the Bush
administration, at least for now, is largely
focused on the military aspect of the global
war on terrorism.
The presence of the U.S. airbase
outside the Manas Airport in Bishkek,
Kyrgyzstan — despite the removal of
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American forces from the Khanabad-Karsi
Air Base in Uzbekistan — indicates that
the presence of U.S. military forces in the
region is not temporary but longterm.4  Not
only Central Asia, but also Azerbaijan in
the Caucasus, is equally vital to the logisti-
cal requirement of safe airspace and a
route for NATO operations in Afghani-
stan.5  Within this framework, Central Asia
will remain central to U.S. foreign policy
for three major reasons.6  First of all, the
global war on terrorism makes Central
Asia a necessary location for military
bases as well as airspace. Second, the vast
energy resources of the Caspian Basin
have been explicitly stated to be vital to the
U.S. strategy of securing alternative
energy resources to those of the Middle
East. Thus, ensuring the safety of the east-
west energy corridor has been a policy
priority since these countries became
independent of the Soviet Union. Third, the
fact that the population is predominantly
Muslim increases the risk of fomenting a
radicalization that could provoke further
terrorism.7
However, despite the short-term focus
on military operations and the long-term
commitment to U.S.-led democratization of
the Middle East, American foreign policy
seems to involve double standards towards
its allies in the global war on terrorism.
While Washington is asking for a more
democratic Lebanon and Syria, attempting
to build democracy in Iraq by force, and
putting increasing pressure on Iran to be
more democratic and to call off its nuclear
program, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and
Kuwait are so crucial to U.S. interests that
they seem to have been granted exemp-
tions. Thus, the longstanding authoritarian
regimes of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan had become confident that
American support would continue to
bolster their authoritarian rule against
radical Islamic challengers.8  The Central
Asian leaders had their hopes raised that
the increasing strategic focus of U.S.
foreign policy on Central Asia in the
aftermath of the Afghanistan and Iraq
wars would mean more grants in aid, debt
relief, and the turning of a blind eye to their
reppressive regimes in the short term.
Additionally, in the long term, stabilizing the
new energy routes across the Caspian Sea
or Afghanistan would encourage further
foreign direct investment in their region.
Nevertheless, when Washington and
European governments requested an
international inquiry into the May 13, 2005,
massacre in the Ferghana Valley city of
Andijan, after receiving testimony from
many sources that the public protest
reflected social and economic frustrations
by an impoverished population rather than
the Uzbek government’s claim of interna-
tional Islamic extremists’ provocations,
Uzbekistan officially asked the United
States to remove its forces from the
Khanabad-Karsi Air Base in southern
Uzbekistan.
THE CURSE OF OIL
The debate on prospects for democra-
tization in Middle Eastern countries has
been thus far misleadingly centered on the
question of the compatibility of Islam and
democracy.9  Despite the growing consen-
sus among policy makers and scholars that
Islam and democracy are compatible, the
myopic perspective guiding democracy-
promotion policies underestimates a
structural problem for democratization in
resource-rich countries. There, the struc-
ture of the distributive or rentier state
combined with the interests of Western
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states in energy security has long been the
major obstacle to domestic political re-
forms.10  For decades, U.S. involvement in
securing the flow of oil from the Middle
East to industrialized Western countries
worked to undermine legitimate popular
aspirations for freedom and participation in
governance.11  However, in the aftermath
of September 11, 2001, the rhetoric of U.S.
foreign policy has been driven by democ-
racy promotion in weak states to prevent
conditions that engender terrorism. There-
fore, the United States must develop a
long-term wide-ranging policy that takes
into consideration not only the strategic
importance of Central Asia but also the
similar structural conditions that have
impeded democratization in the Middle East.
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and
Azerbaijan — the oil- and gas-rich coun-
tries of the Caspian Basin— are important
allies of the United States in fighting
against terrorism and drug trafficking. The
transition problems in these post-commu-
nist countries, in addition to the landlocked
region’s relative isolation from world
markets, have put their economic and
political stability at the top of their leaders’
strategic agendas. In the early 1990s, two
strategic goals were central:12 all three
countries needed hard currency to insure
economic stability, and they had to build
new pipelines bypassing Russia to realize
their independence. Major pipelines
crossing only Russian territory would give
Russia political leverage over the Caspian
countries that neither Azerbaijan nor
Kazakhstan, nor Western multinational
corporations, wished to contemplate.
During the Soviet era, all the oil and
natural gas pipelines in the Caspian region
were designed to link the Soviet Union
internally and were thus routed through
Russia. Prior to 1997, the only major
pipeline available in the region was the
Atyrau-Samara pipeline from Kazakhstan
to Russia.13  In the early phases of oil
production in the major fields of Azerbaijan
and Kazakhstan, smaller amounts of oil
were exported by barge and rail through
Russia. With the new production coming
online, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan needed
new transportation routes to world mar-
kets. Thus, a pro-Western foreign policy
and strategically shaped preferences for
pipeline routes were crucial to balancing
Russian and Chinese influence in the
region. Therefore, the role and influence of
the United States have increased signifi-
cantly in facilitating regional cooperation
and the security of energy transit routes as
well as providing insurance and credit for
American investment in the region.
The larger oil revenues and oil-led
development of these countries have,
however, created rentier states instead of
market economies. Thus, the hopes for
democratization have faded as the political
leadership in these countries distributes
selective benefits to certain political and
social groups in exchange for political
acquiescence.14  The dependence of promi-
nent state bureaucrats, military officials,
regional administrators and businessmen on
the allocation of revenues and resources that
are strictly controlled by the political leader-
ship and its extended network of family/clan
members further strengthens undemocratic
governing institutions. The leaders in power
decouple themselves from their constituents
because they do not need to extract re-
sources from a domestic economy that lacks
diversified sectors.
These leaders have further legitimized
their power by the distribution of social
benefits, employment in the state sector,
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reductions in personal taxes, and subsidies
on consumer goods and public services.15
While the political leadership may not
necessarily promote equal benefits for all
social strata, disenfranchised groups cannot
openly contest the legitimacy of political
institutions, given the absence of fair
elections and the weakness of institutions
in these post-communist countries. Further-
more, the lack of a strong middle class and
civil society limits the possibility of a social
and economic life truly free from state
control.
DEMOCRATIC REFORM?
A quick glance at the current leaders
sheds light on the prospects for democratic
reform in Central Asia.16  President
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan is
the most confident of the group, based on
Kazakhstan’s relatively large economic
windfall from its oil and gas exports, as
well as his relative popularity with the
public. Nazarbayev was elected president
in 1991 and extended his term until 2000
based on the results of a nationwide
referendum on April 30, 1995. His reelec-
tion took place quickly on January 10, 1999,
one year earlier than scheduled, to sup-
press rising opposition. The last election
was held on December 4, 2005. Despite
political gains by the opposition blocs
Democratic Choice and For a Fair
Kazakhstan in the last two presidential
elections, in 2001 and 2005, the opposition
groups could not become influential forces
for more democratic governance for two
reasons. First, control of the distributive
state by President Nazarbayev and his
close family members has allowed them to
continuously increase his popularity by
giving substantial raises in pension benefits
and civil-service salaries. For example,
Nazarbayev reaped high support even in
the economically backward Kyzylorda
region, home base of the main opposition
leader in the last election.17  Second, the
restrictions on freedom of the press and
limits on fair coverage in the media and
freedom of assembly during the pre-
election periods did not give opposition
groups an opportunity to campaign in a
genuinely democratic environment.18
Moreover, President Nazarbayev
stated his plans for what seems to be
unilateral and authoritarian reform of
democratic institutions in his country.19
Although he made public announcements
promising constructive cooperation with
opposition parties and efforts to incorporate
some of his opponents into a coalition
government, economic prosperity based on
larger oil revenues may create few incen-
tives for fully democratic reforms, including
the decentralization of the government, the
election of local governing bodies and
enhancement of civil liberties, especially
freedom of press. The rentier state agen-
cies controlled by President Nazarbayev
and his close family members are likely to
prevail by distributing selective benefits to
certain political and social groups in
exchange for political acquiescence. Thus,
a “velvet” revolution in Kazakhstan is
unlikely. Rather, what we may observe is a
slow “democratization” process that does
not challenge the authoritarian rule of the
president.
In Azerbaijan, we see a similarly close
relationship between a distributive state
and weak democratic institutions. With the
exception of the short presidency of
Abulfez Elchibey between 1992 and 1993,
President Haydar Aliyev was Azerbaijan’s
most dominant political figure after 1969,
as first party secretary of the Soviet
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Republic of Azerbaijan, Soviet Politburo
member, and finally president of the
Republic of Azerbaijan until his death in
2003. Although Aliyev was repeatedly
reelected, the elections were not truly
democratic and fair.20  Great power was
concentrated in the hands of the president,
and regional networks centered around him
and his immediate family/clan have domi-
nated the political landscape. President
Aliyev prepared the political ground for his
son Ilham’s succession. At the end of 1999,
Ilham Aliyev was formally appointed
deputy leader of the New Azerbaijan party,
second only to his father. Thus, the public
and the opposition were expecting Ilham
Aliyev’s candidacy in the presidential race.
On October 16, 2003, the Central Election
Commission21 declared that Ilham Aliyev
had won the elections.22 However, interna-
tional observers such as the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), a democracy watchdog, and the
National Democratic Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs (NDI) declared that the
election could not be considered a genu-
inely democratic process, as it was marred
by widespread and serious manipulations
that included ballot-box stuffing,
unmonitored voting and purges of opposi-
tion voters from the rolls.23
During the last parliamentary elections
in November 2005, Azerbaijan’s well-
developed but fractured political opposition
and the international community put
pressure on the Azeri leadership to conduct
fair elections.  Even though there were
improvements in some respects during the
pre-election period,  notably in the registra-
tion of candidates, important shortcomings
were evident with continued restrictions on
the freedom of assembly, detention of the
opposition “Azatlik” (freedom) bloc
supporters, dominance of pro-government
officers at the national and provincial levels
in the Central Elections Commission, and
deficiencies in tabulating results.24  In fact,
fearing a coup, President Aliyev fired the
economic development minister, Farhad
Aliyev, on charges of conspiring with exiled
opposition leader Resul Guliyev to provoke
unrest and seize power.25  There were
different perceptions about the crackdown
on opposition leaders and reform-minded
members of the ruling New Azerbaijan
party. On the one hand, it seemed to be a
power struggle between the dominant party
leaders and reform-minded members that
could be interpreted as a sign of President
Aliyev’s weakness.26  On the other hand, it
did in fact reflect his strong presidency
keeping control within the New Azerbaijan
party. However, President Aliyev has all
the means to consolidate his power by
taking advantage of geopolitics and oil-led
development of Azerbaijan.27 Conse-
quently, like Kazakhstan’s President
Nazarbayev, who opted to keep reform
under his authoritarian control, President
Aliyev opts for the path of measured
democratic change. A velvet revolution is
unlikely in Azerbaijan.
In Turkmenistan, the unexpected death
of President Saparmurat Niyazov high-
lighted concerns about potential instability
and the difficulty of predicting the policies
of successive governments in the region,
given the lack of democratic institutions.
President Niyazov allocated a sizable
portion of his country’s natural-gas rev-
enues to sustain his despotism. His regime
has been the most repressive and dictato-
rial in Central Asia. Elected to the presi-
dency of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist
Republic on October 27, 1990, he became
president of independent Turkmenistan on
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June 21, 1992. In January 1994, Niyazov
extended his rule until 2002 and then again
for an indefinite period on December 28,
1999. Turkmen security forces have been
suppressing opposition movements by any
means necessary, while freedom of the
press and civic activity by nongovernmen-
tal organizations (NGOs) are severely
limited. While the leaders of energy-rich
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan seem to allow
for gradual democratic changes under their
authoritarian rule, President Niyazov
ensured that no opposition leader could
establish a power base and ruled the
country with his cult of personality. Opposi-
tion leaders have either been imprisoned or
forced into exile, which in turn strength-
ened the role of the internal security
service in determining the next president.
In fact, the opposition leaders in exile
were not allowed to return to their country
for the presidential election held on Febru-
ary 11, 2007. The acting president,
Gurbangali Berdymukhamedov became the
new president, as expected.28  Despite the
early statements by the new president
underlining a continuity in the policies set
by Niyazov, President Berdymukhamedov
will hardly be able to consolidate his power,
since members of the Turkmen elite and
opposition leaders in exile sooner or later
will seek support from abroad to develop
and export the significant natural-gas
resources of the landlocked country.
At present, Turkmenistan is forced to
export the majority of its natural gas
through the pipeline system of Russia’s
state-controlled Gazprom.29 Accordingly,
President Niyazov’s death also revitalizes
the trans-Caspian pipeline project to
transport the vast natural-gas reserves of
Turkmenistan via the east-west energy
corridor supported by the United States,
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Thus, a
rivalry between Russia, the United States
and China on developing and transporting
Turkmen natural gas has already been set
into motion. However, regional stability is
strongly in the interest of all concerned
regional powers and the United States in
light of increasing turbulence in Iraq as
well as on-going instability in southern
Afghanistan. Consequently, any democratic
or chaotic regime change in Turkmenistan
is strictly dependent on the extent to which
the new regime would be able to obtain
support from external actors without
jeopardizing their regional and energy
security interests.
In Uzbekistan, President Islam
Karimov is also considered to be an
authoritarian leader, and his suppression of
political pluralism has been only slightly less
severe than Niyazov’s in Turkmenistan.
While the authoritarian leaders of oil-rich
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan can allocate
selective benefits to important political and
social groups in their countries, President
Karimov has been relying on his country’s
strategic role in fighting terrorism and
cracking down on radical Islamic groups in
the region. Karimov became the first
secretary of the Communist party of
Uzbekistan in 1989. In December 1991, he
was elected president of independent
Uzbekistan. President Karimov’s original
term was extended for an additional five
years in a national referendum held on
March 27, 1995. He was reelected on
January 9, 2000. In January 2002, there
was another referendum to extend his term
to 2007 by amending Uzbekistan’s constitu-
tion to allow for seven-year presidential
terms. There has been little progress in
allowing truly free media and independent
opposition groups to operate in the country.
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Furthermore, President Karimov
clearly proved his beyond-authoritarian
suppression to the point of killing hundreds
of protestors during the outbreak of
demonstrations in Andijan in southern
Uzbekistan.30  The May 13 massacre in
Andijan, which seemed to be a continuation
of a longer-running campaign to curb the
activities of any organization operating
outside government control, put NGOs
under mounting pressure. In fact, a vigor-
ous campaign emphasizing patriotism has
been launched throughout the country,
driven by every media outlet, reminding the
public of President Karimov’s continuing
control and of his no-tolerance policy
against opposition demonstrations.31
Uzbekistan has also signed a new military
agreement with Russia. According to the
treaty, Russian military forces may be
deployed in Uzbekistan in the event of a
national crisis and with Tashkent’s ap-
proval.32  Therefore, President Karimov
aims to secure his regime with Russia’s
renewed partnership in order to consolidate
his power and receive foreign assistance
free from demands for democratic reform.
Nevertheless, it is unclear how long
President Karimov can stave off a rapid,
and most likely uncontrolled, bloody
revolutionary change.33
President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan
was the only political leader in the region
whose past was not closely associated with
the Communist party. His intellectualism
and academic career carried him to the
presidency uncontested.  He took office on
October 12, 1991, and was reelected in
December 1995 and again in October
2000. Kyrgyzstan was the most open
country in all of Central Asia. The press
and the activities of NGOs have been fairly
free.34  Nevertheless, President Akayev
put official pressure on independent
political groups and media that were
demanding reform or his resignation. He
made efforts to retain control by promising
reform of the constitution and the subordi-
nation of some of his power to the govern-
ment and the parliament. Despite his
promise not to run in the presidential
election in October 2005, the parliamentary
elections in February 2003 resulted in
domination by his cronies, including his
daughter. This, in turn, led to suspicions of
his increasing authoritarianism. Mass
demonstrations forced President Akayev to
leave the country.
The peaceful but chaotic overthrow of
President Akayev was largely due to his
wisdom in ordering the military not to use
force against the demonstrators. When the
opposition leaders and the new parliament
members achieved a consensus on organiz-
ing elections, President Akayev resigned
from his post. Kurmanbek Bakiyev be-
came the new president after elections
were held in June 2005. It is not surprising
to see this revolutionary movement in
Kyrgyzstan coming after those in Ukraine
and Georgia. The common feature of these
countries is that they have neither dictators,
as in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, nor
rich energy resources to distribute in
support of their authoritarian rule. The
leaders in power in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine
and Georgia could not decouple themselves
from their constituents; they needed
political legitimization in order to extract
resources from the domestic economy to
maintain public services. Lacking export
revenues from oil and gas, these countries
experienced economic hardship in their
transition to a market economy. Thus,
having rich natural resources complicates
the prospects for the economic growth and
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democratic reform that made a shift of
power in Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Georgia
inevitable.
U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The trade-off between stability and
democratization in the landlocked countries
of Central Asia highlights a gap between
the rhetoric and practice of U.S. foreign
policy. In the aftermath of the revolution in
Kyrgyzstan, the first priority for U.S. policy
would seem to be stabilizing the region in
order to secure the east-west energy
corridor and not to allow any other “failed
states” to fall into the hands of radical
Islamic groups or warlords. Rather than
being pressured by the United States to
democratize, the Central Asian leaders are
mostly encouraged to play their role as
strategic partners in the war against
terrorism. Thus, they feel comfortable in
bolstering their authority by capitalizing on
the attention being focused on preventing
terrorist activities in the region.
The biggest challenge for the United
States government among the people of
Central Asia is, therefore, restoring its
credibility, which has been damaged by
chaos in Iraq, the symbol of the failure of
the U.S. military intervention to secure and
stabilize that country. Furthermore, the
crisis over nuclear proliferation in Iran has
highlighted the importance  of the U.S.
military presence in Central Asia; Central
Asian leaders have been unwilling to be
allies of the United States in the event of
an attack against Iran. Thus, the twin
prerequisites of building a genuine civil
society and enough regional security to
strengthen the democratization process
should induce a serious rethinking of the
roles of both U.S. foreign policy and
foreign energy companies in the region.
The liberal-democracy model promoted
by U.S. foreign policy creates a “low-
intensity democracy” that fails to develop
the genuine civil society and democratic
institutions that might broaden political
participation.35 If democracy is to emerge
from an indigenous process, then democ-
racy-promotion policies should not focus
strictly on formal electoral rights, since
they may mask problems over what values
and interests are being promoted by the
elites. In other words, democracy promo-
tion can lead to a conception of civil
society that excludes socially and economi-
cally disadvantaged groups from political
participation. Civil society is the middle
ground between big business and the
government, a place limited to neither the
political arena nor the market. Thus,
programs building “social capital” in
education, health and small enterprises are
required in the development of civil society.
Democracy-promotion policies focusing on
the formal electoral system result in a
narrow civil society that fails to take into
account major social and economic re-
forms critical for the peaceful democratiza-
tion process in these countries. Therefore,
a genuine civil society built on the efforts
of domestic reformers and supported by
the United States is critical for the legiti-
macy of any power transition and security
in the region.
Although American energy companies
have large investments in the oil and gas
sectors of Central Asia, they do not have
an immediate incentive to play an influen-
tial role in the democratization process.
Rather, they are more concerned with the
unknown risks of instability if an opposition
movement provokes chaotic upheaval. For
example, many Western oil executives
retain strong memories of the political
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chaos following the insurgency against
President Elchibey in Azerbaijan in 1993
and the invalidation of the oil agreements
when former President Haydar Aliyev
came into power. Nevertheless, democratic
institutions and governance as well as a
diversified economy in the energy-rich
countries of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and
Turkmenistan are consistent with the long-
term interests of the foreign companies.
Therefore, there is a much-needed collabo-
ration not only between the U.S. govern-
ment and American companies but also
between the European Union and Euro-
pean energy companies in the region to
build a long-term strategic agenda integrat-
ing energy and regional-security policies
into an indigenous democratization process.
Despite an increase in funding from
the United States for democracy assis-
tance, the highest increase has been in
security and the economic and social
sectors.36  Thus, in addition to a broader
perspective on democracy-promotion
policies, more funds for genuine civil-
society development are clearly needed.
The prospects of democracy in Central
Asia and the role of the United States in
the democratization process in developing
countries require a long-term strategic
agenda not limited to energy security and
terrorism.
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